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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Massachusetts’ landmark 2006 health reform legislation sets an important precedent for national
reform. Initial evaluations have demonstrated the law’s success in dramatically expanding health
insurance coverage and health care access, but less is known about its effects on community
health centers, which serve one of every 13 residents and one in four low-income residents. This
analysis evaluates the experiences of health centers with the Massachusetts reforms, using
administrative data to examine finances and patient enrollment in addition to the qualitative
results of in-depth interviews conducted during site visits in August 2008 and the results of a
short survey of health centers.
The reforms sought to achieve near universal health insurance coverage for state residents, based
on the tenet of shared responsibility for health insurance coverage among the government,
individuals, employers, health care providers, and insurers. While the individual mandate that
became effective in July 2007 is the best-known dimension of the plan, its success also hinges on
a “pay or play” requirement for larger businesses and the establishment of a “Connector” to
expand individual and small group health insurance coverage options. The state Medicaid
program was expanded in July 2006, and over the next year, a new subsidized insurance
program, Commonwealth Care, became available to persons with family incomes below 300
percent of the federal poverty level ($52,800 for a family of three in 2008).
The reforms have been widely credited as successful in expanding insurance coverage in
Massachusetts; estimates vary, but the number of uninsured fell by about half in the year
following implementation of the reforms. Some individuals are still unable to afford insurance,
however. In addition, the experience in Massachusetts indicates that insurance does not
guarantee access to care; a shortage of physicians has made it difficult for many to access
primary care.
Effects of the Reform on Community Health Centers
•

Community health centers continue to play a critical role in caring for newly-insured
patients while simultaneously serving as the primary care safety net for uninsured
residents. Between 2005
and 2007, the total number
Figure A: Health Center Patient Caseload and
of patients at health centers
Insurance Revenue Sources, 2005-2007
rose by 50,000, during a
482,503
period when many newly
446,559
431,005
Private
19%
insured residents had
18%
18%
19%
problems otherwise
8%
Medicare
7%
7%
securing primary care (see
42%
42%
Medicaid/CHIP
Figure A). While the
42%
42%
38%
overall number of
CommCare &
uninsured people in
Other Public
5%
Massachusetts fell by about
33%
Uninsured
26%
36%
half between 2006 and
2007, the number of
2005
2006
2007
uninsured patients served
Note: CommCare and Other Public served 1% of patients in 2005 and less than 1% in 2006
by health centers fell by
Source: GW analysis of Massachusetts Uniform Data System data
Number of
Patients
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only 25 percent. As a
result, the proportion of
uninsured Massachusetts
residents served by health
centers grew from 22
percent in 2006 to 36
percent in 2007 (see
Figure B).
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Figure B. Share of Massachusetts Uninsured
Receiving Primary Care at Health Centers, 2006 & 2007
% of Uninsured Who Are
Patients at Health Centers

22%

36%

•

Many of the newly insured
patients at health centers
had previously been their
uninsured patients, but
health centers also gained
2007
2006
new patients. Adult
patients comprised a
Source: GW analysis of Uniform Data System and Census data
disproportionate share of
the new patients, since children were already insured. Health centers reported that many
of their newly insured new patients were middle-aged or near-elderly adults who had
previously been unable to secure care because they were uninsured. Many of these older
adults were at higher risk for chronic illness and disability and had a pent-up demand for
care. This experience underscores the importance of assuring system readiness for a
patient population that may have high initial utilization as untreated health care needs are
finally addressed.

•

The reform did not alter
Figure C: Health Centers’ Average Total Margins, 2005
the overall financial status
to 2007
of health centers.
Revenues increased by
2.0%
about 14 percent between
2%
2006 and 2007, but
expenditures also climbed
1.1%
1%
by 15 percent. Cost
increases were seen for
-0.5%
clinical care as well as
0%
administrative activities.
About half of the centers
2005
2006
2007
had positive margins in
-1%
Margin (%)
2007 while the other half
had negative margins;
Source: GW analysis of Massachusetts Uniform Data System data
average margins improved
from 2005 to 2006 but decreased a little from 2006 to 2007 (see Figure C).

•

Health center revenue mix changed, with state grants declining and insurance revenue
increasing. Patient revenue from health insurance, particularly Commonwealth Care and
MassHealth (the state’s Medicaid/CHIP program) climbed, while state grants and state
funding for uncompensated care fell.
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•

Health centers play an important role in enrolling patients in the new system. Using
the state’s online “Virtual Gateway,” health center staff help patients enroll in
MassHealth, Commonwealth Care and the Health Safety Net (the state’s uncompensated
care program). This responsibility has increased staff administrative workloads as a
result of the sheer increase in the volume of patients seeking enrollment assistance and
the increasing complexity of the enrollment process.

•

Health centers had to cope with staffing concerns. Staff recruitment and retention are
ongoing issues at health centers, and insurance expansions led to increased demand for
health care services exacerbating this problem. After the reforms, health centers typically
raised provider salaries to remain competitive and undertook other staff recruitment and
retention efforts. For example, in a manner akin to the National Health Service Corps, a
state public/private funding partnership created a special loan repayment program to
attract primary care physicians into health center practice.

Lessons for National Health Reform
The effect of the Massachusetts reforms on health centers can inform future state and national
reform efforts. It is still early in the implementation of Chapter 58, but several lessons are
highlighted by examining the reforms. Insurance does not guarantee access, so insurance
expansions need to be accompanied by investments in the health delivery infrastructure,
particularly primary care capacity. Safety net providers, especially community health centers,
continue to be a vital source of care in a post-health reform world.
•

Insurance expansions can lead to a surge in the demand for primary health care,
especially in medically underserved low-income communities. In addition, the newly
insured patients may require care for chronic health problems that were not treated when
they lacked insurance.

•

In addition to expanding insurance coverage, investments to expand the capacity of the
primary care system that will care for the newly insured, as well as for those who
remain uninsured will be important. Both transitional and ongoing support will be
needed to help community health centers meet the new demands of a transformed health
system, including investments in infrastructure and continued recognition that the
vulnerable patients receiving care at health centers may have more complex health and
social needs than those of the general population. Programs like the National Health
Service Corps may need to be enhanced to help attract clinicians to practice in medically
underserved areas.

•

Even post-reform, there will be a continuing need for sources of care for the
uninsured. If insurance expansions lead to a general increase in the demand for primary
care services, the safety net of community health centers may become even more
important as a source of care for those who remain uninsured.
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INTRODUCTION
Because of the central role played by primary health care in a well-functioning health care
system,1 an important policy question about health reform is the effect on primary health care
access, capacity, and performance. The nature of this inquiry grows urgent in the case of
medically underserved communities and populations at elevated risk for poorer health status,
disparities in health and health care access,2 and a shortage of primary health care professionals.
The nation’s more than 1,000 federally and state-supported community health centers represent a
principal source of primary care for medically underserved communities and populations,
serving more than 16 million patients in 2007 at more than 6,000 sites.3 Health centers play a
particularly important role in Massachusetts; in 2007, health centers served one out of every 13
state residents. Because of the similarities between Massachusetts’ 2006 health reform plan and
the types of national reforms being considered,4 the experiences of health centers in
Massachusetts can help inform the national debate.
This report assesses the experience of Massachusetts’ community health centers—an important
part of the health care safety net that provides comprehensive primary care for low-income and
uninsured patients—in the early stages of health care reform. We use mixed methods to explore
the effect of the reforms on health centers throughout the state, including analyses of
administrative data, case study interviews with executives at five health centers, a brief financial
and enrollment survey, and discussions with numerous experts in the state. We describe the
implementation experience of the reforms at health centers, highlighting the ongoing need for the
care provided at community health centers, the enrollment and financial impact of health reform,
staffing shortages, and the ways that these changes have affected patients receiving care at health
centers.

BACKGROUND
Community Health Centers in Massachusetts
Community health centers provide community-based comprehensive primary health care to lowincome and uninsured patients throughout the state. In addition to providing primary care
medical services, health centers often provide other services, including dental care, emergency
care, mental health counseling, HIV services, migrant health care, case management, WIC
supplemental nutrition services, family planning, pharmacy, vision, and other ambulatory care
services. Health centers are nonprofit organizations, led by patient-majority boards, and are
federally mandated to provide health care to anyone in need, regardless of income or insurance
status. Many health centers, particularly the larger ones that are often called federally-qualified
1

Davis, K., Schoenbaum, S. and Audet, A. “A 2020 Vision of Patient Centered Primary Care.” Journal of General
Internal Medicine. 20(10) 953-957, 2005.
2
Shi, L., Starfield, B., Politzer, R. and Regan, J. “Primary Care, Self-Rated Health, and Reductions in Social
Disparities in Health.” Health Services Research. 37(3): 529-550, 2008.
3
George Washington University Analysis of Uniform Data Systems data.
4
McDonough, J., Miller, M. and Barber, C. “A Progress Report on State Health Access Reform.” Health Affairs.
27(2): W105-w115, 2008.
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health centers (FQHCs), receive
federal grants under Section 330 of
the Public Health Service Act,
administered by the Bureau of
Primary Health Care.

Figure 1: Massachusetts Community Health Center
Patients by Income, 2007

Over 200% of Poverty

100% of Poverty
or Below

10%

One of the first community health
62%
centers in the nation was founded
in Boston in 1965 by Drs. Jack
Geiger and Count Gibson in the
101% to 200%
of Poverty
low-income ColumbiaPoint
29%
housing complex. The
Massachusetts League of
Community Health Centers, which Source: GW analysis of 2007 Massachusetts Uniform Data System, HRSA. The percentages are of
represents health centers statewide, those with known income; about 28% had unknown income.
now has 52 health center
members.5 The Massachusetts Division of Health Care Financing and Policy recognizes 108
licensed health center delivery sites (i.e., clinics) across the state, operating under freestanding
health center licenses or under hospital licenses. Although some of the health centers that are
members of the Massachusetts League of Community Health Centers or recognized by the state
are not FQHCs, all health centers have similar patient characteristics, given their location in lowincome and medically vulnerable communities.
Currently, Massachusetts has 34 FQHCs, many of which operate multiple clinic sites. In 2007,
these centers served nearly 483,000 patients, or about one out of every 13 Massachusetts
residents and one out of every four low-income residents.6 Figure 1 shows that nine out of ten
patients in 2007 had incomes less than or equal to 200 percent of the federal poverty level.
Nearly 36 percent of FQHC patients are nonwhite and 40 percent require translation services.
Because of their location in
communities at high risk of poor
Figure 2: Insurance Coverage for Patients Seen at
health, health centers in
Community Health Centers in Massachusetts
Massachusetts help alleviate
Compared to U.S. Physician Offices
61%
disparities in health care access and
Massachusetts FQHCs
U.S. Physician Offices
outcomes.
Health centers are critical sources of
care for uninsured and low-income
Medicaid patients. Nearly two-fifths
of health center patients in 2007
were uninsured, compared to four
percent of the patients receiving care
in physicians’ offices nationwide in
2006 (Figure 2).

39%

35%

24%
16%

14%
4%
Medicaid

Uninsured

8%

Medicare

Private
Insurance

Source: Health center data from 2007 Uniform Data System. Overall physician office data from
Cherry, et al. (2008).

5

For more extensive information about health centers in Massachusetts, see the Massachusetts League of
Community Health Centers’ website, www.massleague.org.
6
2007 Uniform Data System (UDS), HRSA, and the Census Bureau's March 2008 Current Population Survey.
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A much larger share of health center patients are covered by Medicaid than those receiving care
in private physician practices. 7
Health centers in Massachusetts are supported by the state with financing in the form of state
grants and the Health Safety Net, which replaced the Uncompensated Care Pool as the source of
reimbursement for care for the uninsured. Medicaid funding and federal grant funding are also
major financing sources for health centers in Massachusetts.
Health Reform in Massachusetts
In April 2006, Massachusetts enacted a landmark comprehensive health reform law, “An Act
Providing Access to Affordable, Quality, Accountable Health Care,” also known as Chapter 58.
This law was preceded by a series of incremental health reform efforts moving toward universal
coverage in the Bay State, including a 1988 health reform law that was subsequently repealed, a
1996 law that expanded coverage under MassHealth (the Medicaid and CHIP program), and
other incremental state laws.8 The state’s success in enacting a bipartisan health reform law and
implementing it has led Massachusetts to be viewed as a model for health reform at the national
level and by other states seeking to reform. Initial evaluations indicate that the law was
successful in leading to substantial reductions in the number of uninsured people, and in turn,
improving access to health care.9
Less is known, however, about the effects of health reform on safety net health care providers
who traditionally bear the burden of providing health care to uninsured and low-income patients
when the number of uninsured is greatly curtailed. Proposals to expand health insurance
coverage are often financed, at least in part, by reducing grants or other subsidies to safety net
providers, highlighting the tacit assumption that subsidies can be reduced when insurance
coverage is more plentiful.
Chapter 58: The Reforms
Massachusetts has long been a leader in health reform, even before the enactment of Chapter 58
in 2006 and rapid implementation of the law. Before the reforms, Massachusetts had relatively
broad health insurance eligibility under public programs, including Medicaid, the State
Children’s Health Insurance Program and other state-funded coverage programs. Regulation of
the private insurance market, including individual and small group markets, was already fairly
comprehensive. The state also had a substantial Uncompensated Care Pool that subsidized care
for low-income uninsured patients at community health centers and acute care hospitals. Thus,
7

2007 data for health centers from the UDS and 2006 data for overall physician offices is from Cherry, D., et al.
“National Ambulatory Medical Care Survey: 2006 Summary” National Center for Health Statistics, National Health
Statistics Reports No. 3., Aug. 6, 2008.
8
McDonough, J., et al. “Massachusetts Health Reform Implementation: Major Progress and Future Challenges,”
Health Affairs, 27(4):w270-84, 2008. Hager, C. “Massachusetts Health Reform.” Journal of Legal Medicine 29(1):
11-22, 2008. McDonough, J., et al. “The Third Wave of Massachusetts Health Care Access Reform.” Health Affairs
25: w420-w431, 2006. Turnbull, N. “The Massachusetts Model: An Artful balance.” Health Affairs 25: w453w456., 2006.
9
Long, S. “On the Road to Universal Coverage: Impacts of Reform in Massachusetts at One Year,” Health Affairs,
27(4):w270-84, 2008 (2008a). Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and Policy. Health Care in
Massachusetts: Key Indicators, November 2008.
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Massachusetts already had many building blocks in place enabling near-universal health reform
initiatives.
The reform law is designed to lead to coverage of almost all state residents. It is based on an
assumption of shared responsibility for health insurance coverage by individuals, the government
and employers. Key features of the law are as follows:10
•

Individual Responsibility. Persons over age 18 are required to purchase health insurance
coverage, if “affordable” coverage is available. Those who do not have coverage will
pay an income tax penalty. Certain hardship exemptions are available.

•

Government Responsibility. MassHealth was expanded to cover children with incomes
below 300 percent of the federal poverty line. A new program, Commonwealth Care
(CommCare), was developed to cover uninsured people with incomes below 300 percent
of the poverty level, particularly those who are not offered affordable employersponsored insurance. There are no premiums for those with incomes below 150 percent
of poverty and there are sliding scale premiums for those between 150 percent and 300
percent of the poverty level. In addition, Chapter 58 created the Commonwealth Health
Insurance Connector Authority to function as an insurance exchange to provide easier
access to approved health insurance products for small businesses and for individuals
with incomes above 300 percent of the poverty level. Several plans are offered as
Commonwealth Choice (CommChoice) options and employees can use pretax dollars to
purchase coverage under approved plans.

•

Employer Responsibility. Employers with 11 or more employees must either make a “fair
and reasonable” contribution toward health insurance premiums for their employees or
pay a “Fair Share” assessment per uncovered worker. Firms with 11 or more employees
must offer a “Section 125” cafeteria plan to help employees pay for health insurance
using pre-tax dollars. Firms that do not comply may be assessed a “free rider” surcharge
if their employees receive free care during the year.

•

Provider and Insurer Responsibility. The Health Safety Net (HSN) replaced the
Uncompensated Care Pool (UCP) as the primary mechanism for paying for care received
by the uninsured. Low-income individuals who are uninsured (or underinsured) may
enroll and receive subsidized care at selected community health centers and acute care
hospitals. The funding is made available through assessments placed on health care
providers and health insurance plans.

According to state estimates when the law was passed, the reforms were expected to cost about
$1.2 billion in FY 2007, $1.3 billion in FY 2008 and $1.6 billion in FY 2009.11 The main
expected budgetary increases were for CommCare subsidies and Medicaid provider rate
increases, which were expected to gradually rise. On the other hand, funding levels were
expected to dwindle over time for the Uncompensated Care Pool/Health Safety Net (UCP/HSN)
10

Blue Cross Blue Shield Foundation of Massachusetts. “Massachusetts Health Care Reform Bill Summary.” June
30, 2006. Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured. “Massachusetts Health Care Reform: Two Years
Later,” May 2008.
11
Blue Cross Blue Shield Foundation of Massachusetts, op cit.
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for providers and for managed care organization supplemental funding. For example, the
UCP/HSN funds were projected to fall by almost half from $610 million in 2007 to $320 million
by 2009. There were multiple sources of funding, including federal safety net revenue and new
federal Medicaid matching funds.
Impact of Reform
In 2008, as evidence of the effects of the health reform have accumulated, a study by the Urban
Institute has received particular attention.12 Researchers fielded statewide surveys of adults 19 to
64 years old in fall 2006 (immediately prior to the implementation of many of the key reforms)
and conducted a second survey in fall 2007 (about a year after the reform efforts began). They
found that the rate of uninsurance fell from 23.8 percent to 12.9 percent for low-income adults
(below 300 percent of poverty) and from 5.2 percent to 2.9 percent for higher-income adults.
The study also documented improvements in both employer-sponsored and other (mostly public)
insurance coverage, and found no evidence of “crowd-out,” or the substitution of public
insurance for private coverage as a result of incentives created by the reform. A second Urban
Institute study found that coverage improvements were relatively larger for low-income adults,
young adults and those working in small businesses.13 A recent survey of Massachusetts
employers14 confirmed the Urban Institute’s key finding that public coverage expansion does not
necessarily lead to measurable evidence of crowd-out.
The Urban Institute study also found evidence of increased access to care, measured by variables
such as having a usual source of health care, receiving preventive medical care and receiving
dental care, and reductions in the proportion of people who reported not getting needed care in
the past year due to cost. People reported having fewer problems paying their medical bills and
fewer people incurred large out-of-pocket costs for their medical care post-reform.15
The most recent Census data also highlights the same trends. The U.S. Census Bureau recently
released findings from the March 2008 Current Population Survey, the most commonly cited
national survey for health insurance estimates. Our analysis of the Census data, summarized in
Table 1, shows that the number of uninsured fell by about 300,000 between 2006 and 2007, and
the percentage of people who were uninsured fell by about half, from 13.0 percent in 2006 to 7.1
percent in 2007. The Census data also show substantial reductions in uninsurance among both
adults and children, suggesting that comprehensive reform effectively increases coverage even
for populations such as children who previously were eligible for assistance.
In August 2008, the Massachusetts Division of Health Care Finance and Policy (DHCFP)
analyzed administrative reports and estimated that the number of people with health insurance
grew from 5.02 million in June 2006 to 5.46 million in June 2008, an increase of 442,000.
About 40 percent of this increase in covered lives is estimated to be the result of accessible
CommCare coverage, 18 percent is attributable to the MassHealth expansions, 33 percent derives
12

Long, S. (2008a) op cit.
Long, S. “Who Gained the Most Under Health Reform in Massachusetts?” Washington, DC: Urban Institute, Oct.
2008. (2008b).
14
Gabel, J., et al. After The Mandates: Massachusetts Employers Continue To Support Health Reform As More
Firms Offer Coverage, Health Affairs 27(6 web exclusive): w566-75.
15
Long, S., (2008a) op cit.
13
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Table 1:
Changes in the Level of Uninsured in Massachusetts, 2006 to 2007,
Based on Current Population Survey Data

All Incomes
2006
2007
Below 300 Percent
of Poverty
2006
2007

Uninsured All Ages
# in 1,000s
Percent

Uninsured
Children 0-17
Percent

Uninsured
Adults 18-64
Percent

657
340

10.4%
5.4%

7.0%
3.0%

13.6%
7.0%

408
193

16.8%
8.1%

13.0%
3.5%

23.6%
12.5%

from increases in private group coverage, and 9 percent results from the purchase of individual
insurance coverage.16
There are modest differences in the estimates from the various sources of the number or
percentage of uninsured people, but the estimates consistently point to a trend of substantial
reductions in the levels of uninsurance within a year of enactment and implementation.
Chapter 58 has successfully increased access to health insurance coverage, but there have been
serious concerns about primary care access. Even after obtaining health insurance, some
residents still encounter difficulties obtaining medical care because of a shortage of physicians
(and other health professionals) in certain specialties or in certain locations.17 The Massachusetts
Medical Society has reported serious shortages of internists, family practitioners and some
specialists in the state.18 Even absent a numerical shortage, the primary care supply in
Massachusetts suffers from the same maldistribution experienced nationally,19 and many
providers are unwilling to treat low-income and uninsured patients.20 One report found the
average wait time for an appointment with an internist in Massachusetts lengthened from 33 days
in 2006 to 50 days in 2008.21 As discussed below, community health centers share these
concerns and often have difficulty recruiting physicians and other health professionals, even
though Massachusetts is home to many medical schools and residency programs.

COMMUNITY HEALTH CENTERS AND HEALTH REFORM
Our study of the effects of health care reform on Massachusetts health centers had two primary
approaches. First, we analyzed enrollment and financial trends for health centers in
Massachusetts, using administrative databases and a special survey conducted by the
16

Massachusetts DHCFP, op cit.
Stewart, Z. “Doctor Shortage Hurts a Coverage for All Plan”, Wall Street Journal, Jul. 25, 2007.
18
Massachusetts Medical Society, “Physician Workforce Study: Executive Summary,” June 2007.
19
Goodman, D. 2008. “Physician Workforce Crisis? Wrong Diagnosis, Wrong Prescription.” New England Journal
of Medicine 358(16): 1658-1661.
20
Stewart, Z. op cit.
21
Kowalczyk, L. “Across Mass., Wait to See Doctors Grows,” Boston Globe, Sept. 22, 2008.
17

9

Massachusetts League of Community Health Centers. Second, we assessed the experiences of
health centers, based on case study interviews conducted at five health centers in August 2008
and on discussions with a wide variety of experts and stakeholders, including a discussion with
executives from numerous health centers and staff of the Massachusetts League of Community
Health Centers.
Enrollment and Financial Changes for Massachusetts Health Centers
Information about patient enrollment and funding can be found in data reported by FQHCs in
Massachusetts for calendar years 2005 through 2007 as part of the annual federal Uniform Data
System (UDS) reporting system (participation is required as a condition of federal health center
funding). It is important to note that the MassHealth expansion occurred in 2006, but most of the
other changes, including the initiation of CommCare, were implemented in late 2006 and early
2007, so the reform continues to have important effects not captured by this data. These analyses
are supplemented with information provided by the Massachusetts Division of Health Care
Financing and Policy based on cost reports filed by freestanding health centers for fiscal years
2006 and 2007, which also includes information about health center “look-alikes” that do not
receive federal FQHC funding, but do qualify for “federally qualified health center”
reimbursement under Medicare and Medicaid. These state data exclude health centers that
operate under a hospital’s license. Finally, a survey conducted by the Massachusetts League of
Community Health Centers in late 2008 and completed by 35 health centers provides an
additional window through which to view the effects of the reforms.
Patient Number and Composition
The number of patients receiving care at FQHCs rose appreciably during the early years of the
reform: by four percent in 2006 and by an additional eight percent in 2007, rising from 431,005
in 2005 to 482,503 in 2007
(Figure 3; more detailed data are
Figure 3: Health Center Patient Caseload and Insurance
found in Table 2 in the
Revenue Sources, 2005-2007
22
Appendix).
Between 2005 and 2006, the
primary reason for caseload
growth was increased enrollment
in Medicaid and CHIP
(MassHealth), which rose by
about 24,000. While most of this
growth occurred among adult
patients, a portion of this increase
was undoubtedly the result of the
expansion of children’s eligibility
from 200 percent to 300 percent
of the federal poverty level.

22

431,005
19%
7%
38%

482,503

446,559
18%
7%
42%

18%

Private

19%
8%

Medicare
42%

42%

Medicaid/CHIP

42%
5%

36%

33%

2005

2006

26%

CommCare &
Other Public
Uninsured

2007

Note: CommCare and Other Public served 1% of patients in 2005 and less than 1% in 2006
Source: GW analysis of Massachusetts Uniform Data System data

GWU analysis of UDS data. The number of FQHCs in Massachusetts rose from 33 in 2005 and 2006 to 34 in
2007.
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In both 2006 and 2007, the percentage of uninsured health center patients fell; a five percent
decline occurred in 2006 and was followed by a 16 percent decline in 2007. It is important to
note that uninsured patients have different financial implications for health centers in
Massachusetts because the health care furnished to most, but not all, uninsured patients receiving
care at Massachusetts health centers qualifies for subsidy payment from the state’s Health Safety
Net fund. Only a few states support their health centers with operating subsidies that finance care
for uninsured payments.
The number of patients with “other public insurance,” primarily CommCare, rose dramatically
from 2,170 patients in 2006 to 26,423 patients in 2007, which is a more than tenfold increase of
over 24,000 patients. The number of privately-insured patients also climbed from 79,441 in
2006 to 92,531 in 2007, an increase of more than 13,000 patients.23 There were smaller
increases in Medicaid, CHIP and Medicare enrollment in 2007.24 These findings are broadly
consistent with the findings from the Urban Institute, which reported reductions in the percent of
adults who were uninsured and increases in the percentage with public and private coverage.25

Percent Uninsured

While the number of uninsured
Figure 4: Uninsured Patients Statewide and at Health
patients fell statewide, the
Centers, 2006 and 2007
proportion of uninsured patients at
health centers declined far less
40.1%
steeply (Figure 4). The Urban
Institute surveys indicate that the
30.4%
percentage of low-income adults
23.8%
23.6%
(below 300 percent of the poverty
12.9%
12.5%
line) who were uninsured dropped
by almost half, from 23.8 percent
to 12.9 percent.26 The Census data
Health Centers
Statewide - Urban
Statewide - Census
show that the percentage of
Institute
uninsured people (all ages) fell by
2006
2007
more than half from 16.8 percent
to 8.1 percent. But the UDS data
Source: Health center data from UDS. Statewide from Long 2008 & Census 2008.
show the reduction in the share of
adult health center patients who were uninsured fell by only about one-quarter, from 40.1 percent
to 30.4 percent. Thus, even after implementation of a health reform initiative that provided
generous subsidies to low-income residents, the proportion of health center patients without
health insurance remained high, and health centers continued to serve a disproportionate share of
residents without health insurance. In addition, in the wake of health reform, health centers
provided care for a much larger share of the uninsured population. Based on the Census count of
the uninsured and UDS data on uninsured patients, health centers served about 22 percent of the
uninsured state residents in 2006; this figure rose to 36 percent of the uninsured in 2007,
underscoring the importance of health centers to the health care safety net.
23

It is possible that there was some misreporting by health centers and that some on CommCare were reported as
having private insurance, because CommCare plans were private firms.
24
George Washington University analysis of UDS data. In UDS data, a patient’s insurance status is based on the
last time he or she was seen. Thus, a patient who was uninsured in February, but on CommCare by December, is
counted as a CommCare patient.
25
Long, op cit. 2008a.
26
Long, op cit. 2008a and 2008b.
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The bulk of the 2007 health insurance expansions in Massachusetts was aimed at adults who
became eligible for CommCare and private health insurance expansions; MassHealth coverage
for children was also expanded, but children’s eligibility was already relatively generous. The
FQHC data demonstrate that post-reform, adults comprised a slightly greater share of health
center caseloads. Although a modest (2.2 percent) increase could be seen in the number of
children served between 2006 and 2007, the number of adult patients receiving care at health
centers grew five times faster, from 315,058 in 2006 to 348,102 in 2007, a 10.5 percent increase.
Revenues
Total revenues for Massachusetts
FQHCs rose by about 14 percent
in 2006 and another 14 percent in
2007 (Figure 5). After adjusting
for medical cost inflation, these
increases correspond to a 10
percent annual increase in
constant dollar revenues.27 (More
detailed data are shown in Table
3 at the end of the report.)

Figure 5: Total Patient Revenues and Revenue Sources
$450.8 mil.
40%

$396.3 mil.

$348.3 mil.

11%

11%

15%

15%
34%
40%

15%

11%
13%
15%

31%
34%

40%

Other
Revenue
State/Local
Indigent
Care
Grants/
Contracts

46%

Patient
Revenue

In 2007, patient-related revenue
from Medicaid and CommCare
2005
2006
2007
payments comprised the major
source of revenue growth.
Source: GW analysis of Massachusetts Uniform Data System data
Patient revenue rose by 30
percent in 2007, while grant and contract revenue rose by only two percent. Federal grants grew
by about four percent in 2007, but state and local grants fell by 12.4 percent and state indigent
care funding (i.e., UCP/HSN) fell by four percent. These reductions offset the gains in
insurance-related revenue.
The revenue increases did not result solely from volume-related increases; they also reflect
changes in payment rates as a result of previous legislation boosting health centers’ payments
under MassHealth by about $10 million annually.
Figure 6 illustrates changes in constant dollar revenues divided by the total number of patients,
providing a more accurate measure of the actual reimbursements paid to health centers on a per
patient basis. After adjusting for both patient volume and for inflation, FQHCs’ per capita
revenue rose by about six percent in 2006 and by two percent in 2007. In 2006, the increases in
per capita constant dollar revenues were relatively equally shared across patient

27

To adjust for inflation, we used the Office of National Health Estimates' medical care implicit price deflator. The
estimated levels were 3.4% in 2006 and 3.2% in 2007. Office of National Health Estimates, CMS, “National Health
Expenditure Projections 2007-2017,” Jan. 2008.
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revenue, grant revenue and
indigent care funding. In 2007,
however, growth in per capita
patient care revenue outstripped
growth in per capita grant and
indigent care revenue.

Figure 6: Total Revenue per Patient and Revenue
Sources (Constant 2007 $)
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While health center revenues
climbed appreciably, their
expenditures on patient care also
rose. UDS data show that health
center expenditures related to
operating costs—including both
administrative and service

34%

34%
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expenditures—grew by 11
percent in 2006 and by 15 percent
in 2007 (Figure 7; see Table 3 in
the Appendix for more detail.)
Similarly, total costs per patient
rose seven percent in 2006 and
six percent in 2007. After
adjustment for medical inflation,
the total costs per patient rose by
four percent in 2006 and three
percent in 2007.
Margins
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Source: GW analysis of Massachusetts Uniform Data System data

Figure 7: Total Costs and Costs Per Patient,
2005 to 2007
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The availability of cost-related
Source: GW analysis of Massachusetts Uniform Data System data
expenditure and revenue data
enable a preliminary analysis of health centers’ financial margins. Since FQHCs are non-profit,
they cannot earn a profit, but they may carry balances (or debts) from one year to the next for
operational purposes. UDS data do not report cost and revenue figures consistently, however.
Revenue data are reported on a cash basis (actual funds received during the year), but costs are
measured on an accrued basis (expenses charged for that period, even if not paid in that year).
Thus, the margins shown here are not properly measured financial margins, but they nonetheless
give a sense of cash flow and the relative balance of costs and revenues.
In aggregate, nominal terms, Massachusetts health centers lost $1.7 million in 2005, but made
$7.8 million in 2006 and $4.9 million in 2007. As a percent of revenue, margins rose from
negative 0.5 percent in 2005 to positive 2.0 percent in 2006, but then declined to 1.1 percent in
2007 (Figure 8). In terms of inflation-adjusted margins per patient, the net margins per patient
fell from $18.11 in 2006 to $10.11 in 2007.
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These average margins do not
adequately portray the distribution
of FQHCs’ financial status,
however. Figure 9 shows the
distribution of margins across the
34 FQHCs in 2007. Margins
ranged from negative 22 percent to
positive 23 percent, and about half
(15) of the centers had negative
margins, while the other half (19)
reported positive margins. Some
of the negative margins were due
to larger revenue reductions that
affected some health centers (such
as those that were affiliated with
certain safety hospitals, discussed
more below), but some of this
variation is part of the usual
variation in business practices. In
2006 there was a similar wide
distribution of gains and losses,
although the gainers and losers
differ in each year.

Figure 8: Health Centers’ Average Total Margins, 2005
to 2007
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Margin (%)
Source: GW analysis of Massachusetts Uniform Data System data

Figure 9: Health Center Total Margins Post-Reform,
2007
30%
20%

10%
The state’s Division of Health
Median margin = +0.5%
Care Finance and Policy (DHCFP)
0%
arrived at similar findings about
-10%
the financial status of freestanding
community health centers for fiscal
-20%
28
years 2006 and 2007. Their
-30%
analyses indicated health centers’
Source: Analysis of Massachusetts Uniform Data System data
median operating margins stood at
0.3 percent in 2006 and 0.0 percent
in 2007, but measured median total margins at 1.1 percent in 2006 and 2.3 percent in 2007. As
was the case with our results, DHCFP found that many health centers had negative balances
while others had positive balances. The findings are broadly comparable, but direct comparisons
between our data and the DHFCP figures are not possible given the differences in types of health
centers reporting (our analysis of UDS data includes FQHCs only, while DHCFP figures include
all freestanding health centers, both FQHC and look-alike) and reporting periods (calendar
versus fiscal years).

28

Mass. DHCFP, op cit. Health centers’ fiscal years vary somewhat, but most often run from July 1 of one year to
June 30 of the next. Thus, fiscal year 2007 typically ended June 30, 2007. The UDS data are for calendar years, so
2007 ends December 31, 2007.
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In addition, the DHCFP data show that the level of funding paid to freestanding health centers
under the Uncompensated Care Pool/Health Safety Net fell by about one-fifth between the third
quarter of 2006 and the third quarter of 2008, from $21 million to $18 million. UCP/HSN
funding for hospitals and hospital-based facilities, including community health centers licensed
under hospitals dropped much more sharply, falling 40 percent from $310 million to $186
million.
In the early fall of 2008, the Massachusetts League of Community Health Centers sought to
collect more current data about health centers’ enrollment and revenue trends by fielding an
e-mail survey. Of the 52 community health centers contacted, 23 responded with financial data.
While these partial responses cannot safely be generalizable to the entire state, they tend to
confirm our findings and suggest a continuation of these trends into 2008.29 They indicate that
state uncompensated care revenues received by health centers continued to decline in 2008,
while revenues from MassHealth and CommCare continued to rise, leading to an overall
increase. Among the 23 centers, UCP/HSN funding fell an estimated 18 percent from fiscal year
2007 to fiscal year 2008, while revenue from MassHealth and CommCare rose continued to rise
by 33 percent from fiscal year 2007 to fiscal year 2008. This survey also indicated that
MassHealth and CommCare enrollment levels continued to rise in 2008, as they had in 2007.
Summary of Utilization, Payers, and Financial Status
Health care reform in Massachusetts had a major impact on the health care activities of health
centers. Overall, patient caseloads rose by about 50 thousand—roughly 11 percent—between
2005 and 2007. Simultaneously, health centers experienced a significant reduction in the
number of uninsured patients, but these reductions were more than offset by gains in the number
of patients with insurance, particularly MassHealth and the new Commonwealth Care program.
Partial data for 2008 suggest that these trends appear to continue through mid-2008.
A crucial question is whether the presence of newly insured patients in health centers makes it
harder for uninsured health center patients to access services, which would be contrary to the
mission and purpose of health centers. The evidence reviewed below indicates that many of the
newly insured patients in fact were health centers’ previously uninsured patients; that is, to a
considerable degree, health center patients remained in place while their source of financing
shifted from uncompensated care funding to patient-related revenue (i.e., health insurance).
Furthermore, the statistics on care to the uninsured presented above reinforce health centers’
continuing safety net role for the uninsured, since they show that over this early reform time
period, the provision of care to uninsured state residents became more concentrated at health
centers. Indeed, although there was a decline in uninsured patients receiving care in health
centers, the reduction was only half the size of the decline in the overall number of uninsured
people in the state. Thus, community health centers remained critical providers of care for
patients, in part because of the shortage of private primary care providers able or willing to
provide services for uninsured or newly-insured patients in Massachusetts. Community health
centers continue to anchor the safety net in Massachusetts, even after reform.

29

In the league’s surveys, data were collected for fiscal years 2006 (October 2005-September 2006), 2007 and the
first three quarters of fiscal year 2008, through June 30, 2008. To enable comparisons between years, data from the
first three quarters of 2008 were extrapolated to yield full year data estimates for 2008.
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Revenues rose appreciably for health centers, but costs rose at about the same pace; as a result,
average financial margins remained close to zero in 2006 and 2007. In 2007, about half the
centers had negative margins, while the other half experienced positive margins. The
composition of revenues changed considerably between 2006 and 2007. State grants and
uncompensated care revenues fell, but insurance reimbursements from MassHealth and
CommCare rose, roughly offsetting the decline in these other revenues. Preliminary data for
2008 suggests that these trends have continued. Of course, whether these offsetting changes can
be sustained is more difficult to assess, in light of the recent economic downturn and the
heightened pressure for deep state budget cuts.
IMPLEMENTATION OF HEALTH REFORM BY HEALTH CENTERS
In late August 2008, GWU researchers conducted site visits in Massachusetts and interviewed
managers and staff of five health centers of various sizes. Researchers also participated in a
broader discussion about the effects of the reforms with representatives of more than a dozen
health centers and staff of the Massachusetts League of Community Health Centers. In addition,
we conducted telephone interviews about health reform with local experts and state officials.
Health Centers’ Overall Perspective on Health Reform
Both before and after the enactment and implementation of Chapter 58, community health
centers have been enthusiastically supportive of efforts to expand health insurance in
Massachusetts, and they are proud to be part of what they view as a vanguard for national
change. Because they serve patients who are disproportionately uninsured and low-income and
because they have community-based boards, health centers view themselves as both health care
providers and as advocates for the uninsured and poor at a community level. While the
interviews highlight a number of implementation concerns, health center interviewees remain
firmly committed to the overall goals of health reform and believe that policies crafted by the
state were generally well constructed and implemented.
Even though health centers already served the uninsured and provided community-based primary
care before the reforms, they believed that the patients who acquired insurance gained access to a
broader array of services, including specialty care, prescription drugs, and inpatient care. Many
newly-insured patients are empowered to seek services now that they finally have insurance;
newly insured individuals who formerly delayed care are now able to access care more easily.
Since chronic conditions may be managed better, some expensive ER visits can be averted, and
lives may be saved. Most patients seem satisfied, but there are anecdotal stories about unhappy
patients. While patients who gained coverage are better off than they were before the reforms, a
limited number of other patients may be worse off post-reform because they may have lost some
subsidies and it may be harder to find primary care.
As shown in the data analysis above, although health centers revenues generally climbed, so did
their costs. While health reform did not bring windfalls to health centers, the additional revenues
allowed them to expand services to reach more patients and in some cases to broaden the scope
of the care they could offer.
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More Patients, Fewer Uninsured
Since implementation of reform, health centers reported to us that they typically experienced
increases in overall patient caseload, and a decline in the proportion of uninsured patients. Health
centers believed that most of their newly patients who now had CommCare coverage were
already patients, and the only thing that changed was their source of payment. In addition, they
also reported serving some new patients who had not previously received care at their facilities.
However, in some cases, the caseload increases were the result of planned facility expansions
which enabled them to see more patients. One center had built a large new clinic facility in a
central location and closed older and smaller sites, thereby enabling the center to see more
patients. Another center reported responding to increased demand by expanding hours to serve
more patients within the same space.
Health centers also believed that some patients selected community health centers because of the
difficulty finding primary care physicians who accepted CommCare. Because of the general
shortage of primary care providers in Massachusetts, private doctors’ offices could be more
selective about the types of patients they wanted to see and may have preferred privately-insured
patients or patients who could pay in cash. Health centers were generally well-represented in the
provider panels of the health plans that serve MassHealth and CommCare.
Before health reform, some health centers worried that insurance expansion might reduce their
patient volumes, since newly insured patients would have other medical care options. But this
did not prove to be the case, according to the health center executives interviewed. Patients
tended to remain with health centers because they were very satisfied with the care they received
at these facilities, and in some cases, because health centers had capabilities—such as bilingual
clinicians or interpreters—or services that other primary care providers lacked, including urgent
care, mental health or dental services. Indeed, as also shown by the administrative data, health
centers generally gained more patients after health reform. This increase in patient caseload,
coupled with a surge in new patients, means that in certain parts of the state, patients may still
have a substantial wait to get an appointment in a health center.
Another post-reform change reported by centers is the shift to an older adult patient population.
Before Chapter 58, Massachusetts already had relatively generous coverage of children in
MassHealth, but coverage of adults was more limited. CommCare expansions particularly aided
low-income adults who had more limited public coverage beforehand. Some health centers
observed that many of the initial new enrollees were middle-aged or near-elderly adults with
chronic health conditions, who had delayed seeking medical or dental care for a protracted
period when they were uninsured. In some cases, these chronic conditions were silent diseases
such as hypertension or diabetes, whose symptoms were not previously recognized. As a result,
medical care pressures and costs may have been heightened because of the pent-up demand for
care among these adults. It is unclear if these needs will abate over time, as the newly insured
begin to receive more routine primary care services. Other research has shown, for example, that
Medicaid expenditures are higher when people first enroll, then gradually decline.30

30

Ku, L. and Cohen-Ross, D. “Staying Covered: The Importance of Retaining Health Insurance Coverage for Lowincome Families,” Commonwealth Fund, Dec. 2002.
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There was some turnover in patients as a result of managed care enrollment procedures in
CommCare and MassHealth, which are both administered by managed care plans. After
enrolling in the program, patients must select one of four participating health plans (Boston
Medical Center HealthNet, Fallon Community Health Plan, Neighborhood Health Plan or
Network Health, owned by Cambridge Health Alliance) and then select a primary care provider
from each plan. Those who do not select a plan are auto-enrolled (that is, automatically enrolled
into a plan), but these auto-enrolled members may switch plans during the 60-day period
following enrollment. Thus, some health center patients may fail to select a plan that is affiliated
with the health center (or they are auto-assigned to another provider), but with help from health
center staff, they are often able to change plans or providers. There were, of course, some
transitional problems with the roll-out of the new system, including the additional time required
for health centers and the health plans to understand their respective positions and obligations.
Although health reform substantially expands coverage, all Massachusetts residents are not
covered. Health center staff observed that some key groups remain ineligible for public or
private health insurance and thus continue to lack coverage. Undocumented immigrants are
ineligible for MassHealth (except for emergency coverage) and for CommCare, and they are
frequently not offered private health coverage. They are eligible for the HSN, however, if they
have low incomes.31 Low-income people are ineligible for CommCare if they refuse to enroll in
available employer-sponsored health coverage within the previous six months that is considered
affordable under state standards (the employer covers at least one-third of an individual policy or
one-fifth of a family policy).32 In these cases, individuals are also ineligible for HSN subsidies,
which might make it harder for them to obtain care in some cases. (FQHCs, however, are
required to serve patients without regard to their insurance status.)
Finally, health center staff noted new problems for those who failed to re-enroll in CommCare on
a timely basis or who missed their premiums and were “locked out” of coverage until they paid
their back-owed premiums. Individuals are required to reenroll in CommCare annually, but
many enrollees were unaware of this requirement, especially those who were automatically
enrolled by the state when CommCare first began. Those who fail to reenroll in the program are
terminated from coverage and usually become uninsured until they complete the reenrollment
process. In addition, if beneficiaries who are required to pay premiums fail to pay those
premiums for 60 days, they are terminated from the program. Both these situations can present
problems for individuals who may experience gaps in coverage as a result of these terminations,
but they can also present problems for health centers. Individuals who lose coverage for either
of these reasons are ineligible for HSN coverage (a change in policy from the old
Uncompensated Care Pool arrangement). Consequently, health centers treating these newly
uninsured individuals would not receive HSN subsidy payments as compensation for the care
provided.

31

State residents are eligible for the Health Safety Net if they are uninsured or underinsured and unable to obtain
affordable coverage and either have low-income (below 400 percent of the federal poverty line) or have high
medical bills. Those with incomes between 200 and 400 percent of poverty get partial coverage and must meet an
income-related deductible.
32
Some exceptions are permissible and there is a process for obtaining hardship exceptions.
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Challenges in Finding and Retaining Staff
As is the case nationally, one of the major problems cited by health centers was the shortage of
qualified and available providers. Some say the provider shortage is the “biggest problem right
now,” and the problem worsened after health reforms increased the demand for care. All the
health centers we visited described special efforts they had made in the previous year to recruit
or retain staff, particularly primary care physicians, but also mid-level professionals such as
nurse practitioners, nurses, and pharmacists. As noted earlier, health care reform has made the
general shortage of primary care practitioners more apparent in Massachusetts.
Many different types of initiatives were used to recruit and retain staff. To remain competitive
and to retain providers, many health centers increased salaries in 2007, in some cases by as much
as 50 percent. Health centers often need to use special programs to help attract clinicians. One
health center that had undertaken a substantial expansion hired six physicians in the previous
year: one recruit used the loan repayment program described below, two were National Health
Service Corps doctors who received federal support to pay for their education or to repay loans,
and the other three were international medical graduates who received special visa status (J-1
visa waivers or H-1B visas) to live and work in the U.S. because they were willing to practice in
health centers.33 It may take months, even years, to recruit physicians under these circumstances.
To attract new doctors, the Massachusetts League of Community Health Centers began a special
program, similar to the federal National Health Service Corps, that helps repay student loans for
new primary care physicians who are willing to commit to practicing in a health center; this
program was sponsored by grants from the Bank of America, the Blue Cross Blue Shield of
Massachusetts Foundation, Neighborhood Health Plan, and Partners HealthCare System; the
program also received state matching funds. This new program essentially makes health center
practice for underserved populations more affordable for medical school graduates with high
loan burdens.
Health centers also encountered problems with the credentialing process. Health plans typically
require that participating providers meet certain qualifications, and network providers must be
credentialed by the entity before they can bill to the plan. However, it could take months for the
managed care organizations to credential a new physician. In such cases, the uncredentialed
physicians could only treat uninsured patients, for whom credentialing is not required, until the
process was completed. This made workflow and scheduling more complicated in the interim
and meant that newly hired physicians could not be used as effectively as the health center had
desired.
All of the centers that we spoke with report problems achieving adequate provider staffing
levels; as a result, they developed various strategies for using staff as efficiently as possible.
Many centers maintain months-long waiting lists for new patients (a phenomenon reported
anecdotally by patients who use other practice settings and who are attempting to newly
register). Health centers might also exclude patients who do not live in their service areas.
33

J-1 visa waivers can be applied to extend visas of foreign physicians who originally came to the U.S. for training
if they agree to practice in health professional shortage areas after completing their training. H-1B visas can be used
to hire foreign workers with specialized skills, such as doctors, who are sponsored by American employers who
must indicate that this will not displace U.S. citizen doctors.
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One health center implemented an “open access” scheduling protocol34 in order to help reduce
waiting time from six to eight weeks to less than one week. Open access permits patients to
return for follow-up visits without having to make appointments months in advance, thereby
reducing the problem of missed appointments, which can be caused by an inability to take time
off from work, find transportation, or make child care arrangements for an appointment that the
patient made months ago but forgot about. Open access also has positive effects on continuity of
care, because this scheduling system enables patients to visit the same provider as often as
possible (at least for non-urgent care).
Varying Financial Risk
As seen in the previous section, revenues and costs alike have been rising for health centers since
2006. However, health center financial status varies widely: some have increased their margins,
while others have experienced negative margins (that is, they have lost money, relative to the
status quo before the reforms). For some centers, the additional insurance revenues offset the
increased administrative burdens and the loss of some grant or UCP/HSN funding. For other
centers, however, the gains in CommCare, MassHealth or private insurance revenue were
insufficient to defray the impact of declines in other state funds and increased administrative
responsibilities, so they lost money.
One key factor that affected health centers in a variable fashion was differential treatment under
the former Uncompensated Care Pool and the current Health Safety Net. Although both the UCP
and HSN provide subsidies for health centers and hospitals, they have been managed differently.
As noted earlier, a small number of health centers are treated distinctly by the state because they
have operated historically under a hospital’s license, even though they might be functionally
independent. Hospital-licensed health centers used to receive higher subsidies under UCP than
the freestanding health centers, in recognition of the historical importance that hospitals and
health centers played in the safety net. Now, both types of health centers are paid on the same
basis under HSN, based on the number of visits by HSN enrollees (although the hospital-licensed
health centers receive some supplemental payments, as do those hospitals). Moreover, payment
rates under CommCare are lower than the rates paid by the UCP to hospital-licensed health
centers. Consequently, as previously uninsured patients who were formerly subsidized through
the UCP gained coverage under CommCare, reimbursements to hospital-licensed health centers
for those patients declined. Thus, the transition from UCP payment rates to HSN and
CommCare payment rates led to reductions in payments for hospital-based health centers, but
increases in payments for freestanding centers.
These changes are not surprising. The budgetary design of health reform assumed reductions in
overall UCP/HSN funding over time, and it was known that hospital-licensed health centers
would experience stronger effects. The administrator of a hospital-licensed health center
acknowledged the importance of the supplemental assistance payments that helped him retain
staff through salary increases and hopes that an increase in the volume of care that his center will
provide will eventually offset the loss of funds if the supplemental payments expire.

34

Mehrota, A., et al. “Implementing Open-Access Scheduling of Visits in Primary Care Practices: A Cautionary
Tale,” Annals of Internal Medicine, 148(12): 915-22, Aug. 2008.
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Greater Administrative Burdens and Costs
In addition to providing care, health centers are also actively engaged in enrollment and patient
education. Health reform meant that health centers had to assume many new administrative
responsibilities, particularly related to new insurance plans. All of the health centers we visited
had staff actively assigned to help enroll people in MassHealth, CommCare or HSN, using the
state-run Virtual Gateway internet portal. While the staff generally gave high ratings to the
Virtual Gateway for functioning well, they also reported that their workloads had gone up
because of these new enrollment activities. Because there was no enrollment process for those
who were uninsured before (even if payments were made through the Uncompensated Care
Pool), the creation of CommCare and the requirement for HSN enrollment has greatly increased
the number of patients who must be enrolled by health center staff. In addition, the workload
requirements per patient have often increased. While health centers understood the reasons for
these new requirements, there were administrative costs associated with these new
responsibilities. Transition costs comprise an often unnoticed administrative cost of reform
initiatives.
Enrollment staff expressed hope that the state could find ways to simplify and expedite the
application process; it was estimated that it takes three trips to a health center for an applicant to
finally gather and present the necessary materials to complete an application. Burdensome
paperwork includes documentation requirements (e.g., Medicaid citizenship documentation
requirements),35 and proof that the patient was not offered affordable employer-sponsored
insurance. Staff also noted that the process for obtaining hardship exceptions for those who
cannot afford employer-sponsored health insurance premiums could be simplified and
streamlined.
In addition, after enrollment is complete, those enrolled in CommCare must be educated about
the requirement to select a plan and a primary care provider, or fall into the auto-enrollment or
auto-assignment traps. Finally, as noted before, many CommCare enrollees must pay premiums,
which increases the risk of dropped coverage and the need to reapply, also increasing enrollment
workloads. One health center director said that he had to triple the number of staff dedicated to
enrollment functions after health reform, even though health centers are not explicitly
reimbursed for enrollment help.
Claims administration also has become more complex. With four plans administering
MassHealth and CommCare (a substantial increase from previous practice under the state’s
Medicaid managed care system), multiple types of claims forms must be processed. Health
center staff thus underscored the importance of including providers in discussions about how to
design new claims systems, since they had to reorganize their patient accounts and billing
formats for various payers. Claims are submitted electronically and some health centers were
concerned about the possibility of increased burdens due to enhanced requirements for the
verification of claims.

See Repasch, L. et al. “Assessing the Effects of Medicaid Documentation Requirements on Health Centers and
Their Patients: Results of a “Second Wave” Survey.” George Washington University, Oct. 2008.
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Positive Impact on Patients’ Access to Care
Health centers generally believed that these changes have been positive for patients; medical
staff expressed the belief that access to comprehensive, appropriate care had improved with the
reforms. Reform helped health centers expand their caseloads so that they could upgrade patient
access and, in some cases, expand the scope of services offered. In addition, granting health
insurance to patients helped patients get other services. Previously, regardless of insurance
status, patients could obtain primary care services at health centers but they might not have been
able to obtain other services, like prescription drugs or specialty care. Thus, for example, they
could be more assured that a patient with diabetes was able to get prescribed drugs or insulin or
access an ophthalmologist to conduct an eye exam for diabetic retinopathy.
The changes in patients’ access depended in part on the scope of services already available at
each health center. For example, some large health centers had their own pharmacies, which are
able to purchase medications at substantial discounts under the Section 340B program, and felt
that having insurance did not greatly change patients’ ability to get drugs, but many health
centers lacked pharmacies and believed that medication access improved. All health centers had
historical relationships with local specialists and hospitals to provide specialty or hospital care
for uninsured patients. For example, hospital-licensed health centers believed that their
uninsured patients were already able to get care at their affiliated safety net hospitals. Other
centers found that access to specialists or hospitals improved once the providers knew that their
patients had insurance.
There was some initial confusion as health centers became familiar with new managed care
networks. Specialists or hospitals with whom the health centers had relationships were not
always participating providers in the health plans that patients had selected. This meant that
health centers needed to develop new relationships based on plan membership. Transitional
problems like these often occur when new managed care plans are initiated.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
While this study focuses on Massachusetts, the findings can be generalized to the national
debate, since the proposals currently under consideration bear a striking resemblance to the
Massachusetts’ reforms in their approach to expanding coverage. In this regard, the most
important lesson to be learned is the continued importance of safety net providers, especially
community health centers, in a post-health reform world. Even if the number of uninsured is
greatly reduced, there must still be a health care infrastructure of primary care facilities to
provide care for the newly insured, as well as those who remain uninsured. Expanding health
insurance is important, but there also must also be a health care delivery system in place that can
respond to the increased demand for care. Therefore, health reform must not only involve
expansion of coverage but also greater investment in primary care infrastructure to ensure access
to care.
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The reform efforts in Massachusetts highlight the following issues as informative as national
health reform is considered:
•

Health insurance expansions can lead to a surge in the demand for primary health
care, especially in medically underserved low-income communities. When people gain
health insurance coverage, this will naturally stimulate the demand for medical care. In
addition, there is often pent-up demand for care by newly insured people who were
unable to afford getting health care when they were uninsured.

•

In addition to the expansion of insurance coverage, investments to expand the capacity
of the primary care system that will care for the newly insured, as well as for those who
remain uninsured will be important. This analysis of the early phase of health reform in
Massachusetts suggests that direct and explicit investments in transforming and
supplementing primary health care capacity represents a key component of national
health reform, particularly for populations and communities at risk of medical
underservice. Massachusetts’ ongoing investment in the health center infrastructure is
crucial, supporting the viability of health centers as they undergird the primary care
safety net and move beyond this role to serve insured patients. Policy makers will need
to remember that the types of vulnerable patients receiving care at health centers may
have more complex needs for medical care, as well as for social and supportive services.
An explicit investment policy can take the form of direct financing like Massachusetts’
uncompensated care pool, or it could involve increasing support of other programs such
as the National Health Service Corps, the loan repayment program used to attract and
retain health care professionals. Over time, these direct investment mechanisms may
change, but sustained investment is critical to the long term goal of rebalancing health
care investments as part of health insurance coverage reforms.

•

Transitional assistance and resources may be needed for health care providers that
serve low-income and vulnerable populations. During the implementation of reform,
health centers and other safety net providers need assistance while they help their patients
secure coverage and make the operational and management shift away from grant funds
and toward the patient-specific revenues that flow from health insurance. These
investments allow providers to manage the costs associated with system change while
they simultaneously respond to a surge in higher need patients and a shift in revenue
sources.

•

Even post-reform, there is a continuing need for sources of care for the uninsured, due
to both the limitations of reform as well as a redistribution of uninsured patients
toward the safety net. This is especially true in the case of primary health care systems
for underserved populations; even though health centers served over 16 million patients
in 2007, another 56 million low-income residents remain without a regular source of
health care.36

36

National Association of Community Health Centers, the Robert Graham Center, and the George Washington
University School of Public Health and Health Services. “Access Transformed: Building a Primary Care Workforce
for the 21st Century.” August 2008.
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It is important to remember that health reform is still in its early stages in Massachusetts; the first
phases began over two years ago but full implementation is much more recent. The serious
budget problems that now confront Massachusetts will provide a much more difficult test of the
resiliency of the state’s reforms and of its safety net providers. The continued strength of
community health centers in Massachusetts will remain critical to the overall success of the
reform efforts. National reform efforts will be bolstered if the safety net is directly fostered;
policymakers should remember that the goal is to improve the access to quality health care, not
just to increase the number of people with insurance policies. Insurance expansions can only
succeed if there are enough physicians, nurses and clinics to care for the patients.
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APPENDIX:
DETAILED DATA TABLES
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Table 2:
Key Patient Indicators for Federally Qualified Health Centers in
Massachusetts: 2005 to 2007 (from UDS)

Number of Centers

2005
33

Number of Patients

431,005

Calendar Year
2006
33

Number of Patients by Insurance Coverage*
Uninsured patients
153,085
0-19 years
23,097
20 years or older
129,988
Medicaid/SCHIP patients
162,156
0-19 years
80,829
20 years or older
81,327
Medicare
30,850
0-19 years
22
20 years or older
30,828
Other Public Insurance
3,388
0-19 years
1,898
20 years or older
1,490
Private Insurance
81,526
0-19 years
23,337
20 years or older
58,189
Total Patients
431,005
0-19 years
129,183
20 years or older
301,822
Percent of Total Patients by Insurance Coverage
Uninsured patients
35.5%
0-19 years
5.4%
20 years or older
30.2%
Medicaid/SCHIP patients
37.6%
0-19 years
18.8%
20 years or older
18.9%
Medicare
7.2%
0-19 years
0.0%
20 years or older
7.2%
Other Public Insurance
0.8%
0-19 years
0.4%
20 years or older
0.3%
Private Insurance
18.9%
0-19 years
5.4%
20 years or older
13.5%
Total Patients
100.0%
0-19 years
30.0%
20 years or older
70.0%

2007
34

% Difference from
2006 to 2007
2005 to 2006
0.0%
3.0%

446,559

482,503

3.6%

8.0%

145,964
19,507
126,457
186,238
87,594
98,644
32,746
22
32,724
2,170
833
1,337
79,441
23,545
55,896
446,559
131,501
315,058

123,388
17,608
105,780
201,815
89,606
112,209
38,346
16
38,330
26,423
2,904
23,519
92,531
24,267
68,264
482,503
134,401
348,102

-4.7%
-15.5%
-2.7%
14.9%
8.4%
21.3%
6.1%
0.0%
6.2%
-36.0%
-56.1%
-10.3%
-2.6%
0.9%
-3.9%
3.6%
1.8%
4.4%

-15.5%
-9.7%
-16.4%
8.4%
2.3%
13.8%
17.1%
-27.3%
17.1%
1117.6%
248.6%
1659.1%
16.5%
3.1%
22.1%
8.0%
2.2%
10.5%

32.7%
4.4%
28.3%
41.7%
19.6%
22.1%
7.3%
0.0%
7.3%
0.5%
0.2%
0.3%
17.8%
5.3%
12.5%
100.0%
29.4%
70.6%

25.6%
3.6%
21.9%
41.8%
18.6%
23.3%
7.9%
0.0%
7.9%
5.5%
0.6%
4.9%
19.2%
5.0%
14.1%
100.0%
27.9%
72.1%

Percentage Point Difference
2005 to 2006 2006 to 2007
-2.8%
-7.1%
-1.0%
-0.7%
-1.8%
-6.4%
4.1%
0.1%
0.9%
-1.0%
3.2%
1.2%
0.2%
0.6%
0.0%
0.0%
0.2%
0.6%
-0.3%
5.0%
-0.3%
0.4%
0.0%
4.6%
-1.1%
1.4%
-0.1%
-0.2%
-1.0%
1.6%
0.0%
0.0%
-0.5%
-1.6%
0.5%
1.6%

* If a patient changes insurance coverage over the year, the type is the last form of coverage.

26

00

Table 3:
Key Revenue Measures for Federally Qualified Health Centers in
Massachusetts: 2005 to 2007 (from UDS)

Nominal Dollars
Total Revenue
Grants/Contracts
Federal
BPHC
Other Federal
Non-Federal
State/Local
Private
Patient Revenue
Insurance
Medicaid
Medicare
Other Public Insurance
(incl. non-Medicaid SCHIP)
Other & Private
Patient Self-Pay
State/Local Indigent Care Revenue
Other Revenue
Total Revenue/Total Patients
Grant Contract Revenue/Total Pt
Patient Revenue/Total Pt
Indigent Care Rev/Total Pt
Other Rev/Total Pt
Constant 2007 Dollars*
Total Revenue
Grants/Contracts
Federal
BPHC
Other Federal
Non-Federal
State/Local
Private
Patient Revenue
Insurance
Medicaid
Medicare
Other Public Insurance
(incl. non-Medicaid SCHIP)
Other & Private
Patient Self-Pay
State/Local Indigent Care Revenue
Other Revenue
Total Revenue/Total Patients
Grant Contract Revenue/Total Pt
Patient Revenue/Total Pt
Indigent Care Rev/Total Pt
Other Rev/Total Pt

2005

Calendar Year
2006

2007

$348,314,734
$119,090,346
$65,028,246
$40,722,733
$24,305,513
$54,062,100
$35,088,861
$18,973,239
$139,722,420
$131,852,144
$84,933,540
$15,957,505
$4,072,842

$396,382,576
$136,168,541
$67,370,162
$41,742,894
$25,627,268
$68,798,379
$45,379,614
$23,418,765
$158,455,210
$149,725,123
$94,124,782
$20,304,265
$3,494,207

$450,750,284
$139,101,108
$70,249,414
$43,641,672
$26,607,742
$68,851,694
$39,744,014
$29,107,680
$205,416,457
$196,540,540
$117,059,436
$25,064,114
$10,246,576

13.8%
14.3%
3.6%
2.5%
5.4%
27.3%
29.3%
23.4%
13.4%
13.6%
10.8%
27.2%
-14.2%

13.7%
2.2%
4.3%
4.5%
3.8%
0.1%
-12.4%
24.3%
29.6%
31.3%
24.4%
23.4%
193.2%

$26,888,257
$7,870,276
$51,321,869
$38,180,099

$31,801,869
$8,730,087
$60,138,501
$41,620,324

$44,170,414
$8,875,917
$57,884,590
$48,348,129

18.3%
10.9%
17.2%
9.0%

38.9%
1.7%
-3.7%
16.2%

$808
$276
$324
$119
$89

$888
$305
$355
$135
$93

$934
$288
$426
$120
$100

9.8%
10.4%
9.5%
13.1%
5.2%

5.2%
-5.5%
20.0%
-10.9%
7.5%

$371,682,473
$127,079,879
$69,390,861
$43,454,740
$25,936,121
$57,689,018
$37,442,903
$20,246,116
$149,096,118
$140,697,841
$90,631,561
$17,028,062
$4,346,081

$409,066,818
$140,525,934
$69,526,007
$43,078,667
$26,447,341
$70,999,927
$46,831,762
$24,168,165
$163,525,777
$154,516,327
$97,136,775
$20,954,001
$3,606,022

$450,750,284
$139,101,108
$70,249,414
$43,641,672
$26,607,742
$68,851,694
$39,744,014
$29,107,680
$205,416,457
$196,540,540
$117,059,436
$25,064,114
$10,246,576

10.1%
10.6%
0.2%
-0.9%
2.0%
23.1%
25.1%
19.4%
9.7%
9.8%
7.2%
23.1%
-17.0%

10.2%
-1.0%
1.0%
1.3%
0.6%
-3.0%
-15.1%
20.4%
25.6%
27.2%
20.5%
19.6%
184.2%

$28,692,136
$8,398,277
$54,764,951
$40,741,525

$32,819,529
$9,009,450
$62,062,933
$42,952,174

$44,170,414
$8,875,917
$57,884,590
$48,348,129

14.4%
7.3%
13.3%
5.4%

34.6%
-1.5%
-6.7%
12.6%

$862
$295
$346
$127
$95

$916
$315
$366
$139
$96

$934
$288
$426
$120
$100

6.2%
6.7%
5.9%
9.4%
1.8%

2.0%
-8.4%
16.3%
-13.7%
4.2%

% Difference from
2006 to 2007
2005 to 2006

* Using CMS medical care implicit price deflator 3.2% in 2007, 3.4% in 2006, 3.5% in 2005.
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Table 4:
Key Costs and Margins for Federally Qualified Health Centers in
Massachusetts: 2005 to 2007 (from UDS)

Nominal Dollars
Total Costs
Total Costs/Total Patients
Net Margin (Revenue - Costs)
Net Margin/Total Patients
Net Percent Margin
Constant 2007 Dollars*
Total Costs
Total Costs/Total Patients
Net Margin (Revenue - Costs)
Net Margin/Total Patients
Net Percent Margin

2005

Calendar Year
2006

2007

$350,073,991
$812

$388,546,372
$870

$445,870,565
$924

-$1,759,257
-$4.08
-0.5%

$7,836,204
$17.55
2.0%

$4,879,719
$10.11
1.1%

$373,559,755
$867

$400,979,856
$898

$445,870,565
$924

-$1,877,282
-$4.36
-0.5%

$8,086,963
$18.11
2.0%

$4,879,719
$10.11
1.1%

* Using CMS medical care implicit price deflator 3.2% in 2007, 3.4% in 2006, 3.5% in 2005.
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% Difference from
2006 to 2007
2005 to 2006
11.0%
7.1%

14.8%
6.2%

7.3%
3.6%

11.2%
2.9%
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